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Abstract: This essay uses the concept of Christian nationalism to explore the religious dynamics
of the Contra war and U.S.–Nicaraguan relations during Ronald Reagan’s presidency. Religious
organizations and individuals played crucial roles on both sides in the war in Nicaragua and in
the debates in the United States over support for the Contras. Evangelistic work strengthened
transnational ties between Christians, but also raised the stakes of the war; supporters of the
Sandinistas and Contras alike alleged a victory by their adversary imperiled the future of Christianity
in Nicaragua. Christian nationalism thus manifested itself and intertwined in both the United States
and Nicaragua. Examining how evangelicals and Catholics in the United States and Nicaragua,
as well as the Reagan administration, the Contras, and the Sandinistas, used Christian nationalism
to build support for their policy objectives sheds light on both the malleability and the power of
identifying faith with the state. Having assessed Christian nationalism as a tool and a locus of conflict
in the Contra war, the essay then steps back and considers the larger methodological implications of
using Christian nationalism as a category of analysis in U.S. foreign relations history.
Keywords: evangelicals; foreign policy; Reagan; U.S.-Nicaraguan relations; Christian internationalism;
Christian nationalism
On 16 July 1974, Billy Graham addressed over two thousand evangelical Christian leaders who
had gathered in the large assembly hall at the Palais de Beaulieu in Lausanne, Switzerland. Flags from
each of the 150 nations that the members of the audience represented lined the stage. A massive screen
hanging from the ceiling projected live video of Graham, who stood gripping the podium with one
hand as he gestured toward the crowd with the other, so even those sitting far in the back of the hall
could see his face as he spoke. He welcomed the men and women before him to the International
Congress on World Evangelization, an unprecedented gathering he hoped would inspire Christians
across the globe to rededicate themselves to the evangelistic mission of the church. In his plenary
address, Graham highlighted the challenges that Christians faced as they worked toward their goal
of spreading the Gospel to all people on earth. Significantly, he emphasized the threat that Christian
nationalism posed to world evangelism ([1], p. 30).
With his voice rising, Graham condemned the impulse to conflate a particular culture, political
system, or country with the Christian faith, and confessed that this tendency had even endangered the
efficacy of his own ministry. In emphatic tones, he boomed: “when I go out to preach the Gospel now,
I go as an ambassador for the Kingdom of God—and not America. To tie the Gospel to any political
system, any secular program, or any society is dangerous and will only serve to divert the Gospel” [2].
As the translation of his words made its way to the audience members’ headphones, applause erupted
throughout the hall. Evangelical leaders from Latin America, Africa, and Asia welcomed his sentiment.
Some of the speakers who hailed from these regions had incorporated strong critiques of American
Christian nationalism or “American culture Christianity” in the papers they pre-circulated and then
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presented at the Congress ([3], p. 136; [4]). Yet despite Graham’s entreaty, and the emphasis that the
Congress participants and subsequent Lausanne movement placed on developing both indigenous
and cross-cultural evangelism, nationalism and Christianity remained deeply entangled in the decades
that followed.
Indeed, despite his intentions, Graham’s insistence that he represented his faith rather than
his country when he preached abroad only served to underscore the extent to which people living
in other parts of the world viewed him and his fellow American evangelicals as representatives
of the United States. In the paper he presented at the Congress, Latin American theologian
C. René Padilla suggested that U.S. interventions abroad, not to mention the country’s position
as a world superpower, shaped how people who lived in nations that received American missionaries
perceived Christianity ([3], p. 136). Padilla saw “American culture Christianity”—or the conceptual
fusion of Christianity with American capitalism and “‘socio-political conservatism’”—as a hindrance
to evangelism and a reason to impose a moratorium on foreign missions ([3], pp. 125, 136; [5,6]; [7],
pp. 36, 42). Graham and many other U.S. evangelical leaders opposed the suggested moratorium.
Yet, tactical disagreement aside, both Graham and Padilla recognized the power that identifying
Christianity with a particular nation held, not to mention the damage it wrought. For this reason,
the debate over Christian missions and “culture Christianity” that unfolded at the Congress on
World Evangelization revealed an important fault line that existed within the global evangelical
community, and particularly between U.S. Christians and those they sought to evangelize. As American
evangelicals grew more influential as a political bloc in the late 1970s and early 1980s, this disjuncture
between how they and their brethren abroad understood the relationship between their faith and their
nation became increasingly consequential for U.S. foreign relations.
For this reason, thinking about Christian nationalism in a global context holds great analytical
value for historians. Christian nationalism, an ideology or worldview which merges religious and
national identities, shapes the beliefs that individuals hold about the role their country should play
in the world and how their country should interact with other nations. In the late twentieth century,
many members of the Christian right believed that the United States was a Christian nation and that its
culture as well as its laws, politics, and foreign policy should therefore embody the core religious values
that they embraced. In this way, religious nationalism informed their views on international relations,
contributing to the development of an American Christian internationalism that conflated Christianity
with American political and economic principles, and sought to export these values globally.1 Christian
nationalism and internationalism are not exclusively American phenomena, though. Studying the
relationship between Christian nationalism, domestic public opinion, and foreign relations in the
United States as well as in other countries illuminates how ideology and religious beliefs influence
political rhetoric as well as policy.
Even though Graham, Padilla, and the other evangelical leaders at the Congress did not use
the term “Christian nationalism” in their debate over the future of world missions, their efforts to
describe and grapple with the underlying issues that inspired the discussion illuminate key aspects of
the concept. Unwittingly or not, many Christians and non-Christians in the mid-1970s did see a link
1 Over the past two decades, historians of modern U.S. foreign relations have become increasingly open to using religion as a
means for analyzing or understanding policymaking and foreign affairs. More recently, scholars such as Andrew Preston
and Melani McAlister have focused on evangelical Christians, examining how their religious beliefs blended with American
politics, culture, and identity to shape the U.S. role in the world. For example, Preston argues that evangelicals in the
mid-twentieth century acted as internationalist agents, “bring[ing] the world to Americans” as they spread their faith—and
American culture—to the world ([8], pp. 190–91). McAlister brings this concept of “evangelical internationalism” into her
work as well, as she explores American evangelicals’ vision for and interest in global affairs, seeking to understand how their
internationalist outlook shaped evangelical culture and political beliefs [9]. This essay builds on this concept of evangelical or
Christian internationalism, but focuses more explicitly on the concept of Christian nationalism and the relationship between
Christian missions and U.S. politics, policymaking, and diplomacy, including democracy promotion during the Reagan
era. For other recent work on Christian internationalism, broadly defined, see: Thompson [10], Preston [11], Inboden [12],
Herzog [13], and Thomas [14].
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between the Christian faith and Western, specifically American, culture. Yet, as Padilla and Graham
made clear in their Congress remarks, Christians throughout the world contested the identification
of their faith with any one culture, country, or system of government. They and others committed
to world evangelism sought to promote Christianity as a universal faith. Nevertheless, the link
between Christianity and the nation persisted. Furthermore, religious and political leaders could
(and did) operationalize this link, using it justify, impel, or promote national and international policies.
Examining Christian nationalism as both an operational tool and a contested concept in U.S. foreign
relations can help us better understand how religion shaped U.S. policy and the reception those policies
enjoyed abroad.
To this end, this essay will use the concept of Christian nationalism to explore the religious
dynamics of the Contra war and U.S.–Nicaraguan relations during Ronald Reagan’s presidency.
Religious organizations and individuals played crucial roles on both sides in the war in Nicaragua
and in the debates in the United States over support for the Contras. Evangelistic work strengthened
transnational ties between Christians, but also raised the stakes of the war; supporters of the Sandinistas
and Contras alike alleged a victory by their adversary imperiled the future of Christianity in Nicaragua.
Christian nationalism thus manifested itself and intertwined in both the United States and Nicaragua,
due in part to the internal religious dynamics in each country that infused the rhetoric about the
conflict. Examining how evangelicals and Catholics in the United States and Nicaragua, as well as the
Reagan administration, the Contras, and the Sandinistas, used Christian nationalism to build support
for their policy objectives sheds light on both the malleability and the power of identifying faith with
the state. Having assessed Christian nationalism as a tool and a locus of conflict in the Contra war,
this essay will then step back and consider the larger methodological implications of using Christian
nationalism as a category of analysis in U.S. foreign relations history.
When the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) overthrew the reviled dictator Anastasio
Somoza DeBayle in July 1979 and established a revolutionary government, Nicaragua became a
major flashpoint in the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. U.S. leaders
perceived the Nicaraguan revolution as evidence of Soviet and Cuban interference in Central America.
Eager to counter communist incursions in the region, Ronald Reagan committed his administration
to providing military aid to the nascent anti-Sandinista counterrevolutionary movement, known as
the Contras, when he took office in 1981.2 The ensuing war between the U.S.-backed Contras and the
Sandinistas lasted until 1988. Tens of thousands of Nicaraguans died in the fighting and many more
suffered atrocities ranging from torture, maiming, and rape to forcible relocation and the loss of their
property. Christian groups within Nicaragua and the United States involved themselves in the conflict;
Catholics and evangelicals in both countries found themselves divided over which side to support,
and regardless of denomination or nationality, supporters of both the Contras and the Sandinistas
claimed the mantle of Christianity and country.3 Christian nationalist rhetoric infused the debate in
the United States and in Nicaragua over the war, and proved particularly resonant with the public and
with legislators in discussions about religious persecution and U.S. military aid for the Contra forces.
In Nicaragua, church-state relations and religious freedom lay at the heart of these
intra-denominational political divisions among Christians. Though predominantly Catholic, Nicaragua
had a small Jewish community as well as a Protestant population that began expanding rapidly in the
2 There is a wealth of scholarship on the Contra war and U.S.-Central American (and U.S.-Nicaraguan) relations during the
Reagan administration. For background, see LeoGrande [15], LaFeber [16], Grandin [17], and McCormick [18].
3 Much of the existing literature on religion and the Contra war focuses either on denominational change and political
involvement in Nicaragua itself, or on the Catholic and Protestant left’s activism against Reagan’s foreign policy. For the
former, see Gooren [19], Smith and Haas [20]; for the latter, see Strauss [21], Smith [22], Nepstad [23], Peace [24],
and Keeley [25]. Unlike these works, this article takes a different tack by examining the relationship between Christian
nationalist rhetoric, public diplomacy, and policy among evangelical Protestants and Catholics across the political spectrum
in both the United States and Nicaragua. Sara Diamond’s work on the Christian right reflects some of these themes,
and though she completed and published her research before the Contra war ended and only devotes part of a chapter to
the conflict, her book remains a very useful primer. See Diamond [26].
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1970s. The national constitution guaranteed religious freedom, yet for decades the Catholic Church had
enjoyed special state privileges due to its close relationship with the Somoza regime. As the Catholic
clergy and laity grew increasingly critical of the dictator’s corruption and penchant for brutality
during the 1960s and 1970s, the Church leadership tempered and then withdrew its support from
Somoza [19,27,28]. By the time of the revolution, the vast majority of Catholics and Protestants in
Nicaragua welcomed his ouster. That said, this did not mean they universally welcomed Sandinista
leadership. In November 1979, just a few months after Somoza fled Managua and the FSLN claimed
victory, the Catholic Nicaraguan Bishops’ Conference released a pastoral letter that praised “the current
revolutionary moment” as “a propitious occasion to make real the Church’s option for the poor” ([29],
p. 144). This phrasing alluded to Liberation Theology, a theological movement that emerged from
the Catholic Church in Latin American during the 1950s and 1960s and continued to enjoy broad
influence in the region [30,31]. Liberation theology promoted economic and social justice for oppressed
peoples. Yet the Bishops’ statement remained cautious and did not offer unreserved approval of the
Sandinistas or their socialist political aims ([29], p. 144). This caution reflected internal tensions among
the bishops about the relationship between the Catholic Church and the revolutionary government
that only hardened as the FSLN consolidated power in 1981 and 1982.
Despite the hopeful if wary tone that the Bishops’ pastoral letter struck about the possibilities for
achieving social justice and the broad aims of Liberation Theology after Somoza’s exile, the Catholic
church found itself divided deeply over support for the FSLN. A delegation of U.S. evangelicals who
visited Nicaragua in 1982 noted that while “large numbers of clergy and laity (the so-called ‘popular’
or ‘people’s church’) are enthusiastic about the revolution,” the church hierarchy had split: “four of
the eight bishops are supportive and four are not” ([32], frame 294). When a number of revolutionary
Catholic priests received appointments to important posts in the Sandinista government, including
the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Education, the archbishop of Managua Miguel Obando
y Bravo and other conservative members of the Catholic hierarchy attempted to discipline them for
their involvement in the government ([19], p. 344; [32], frame 292). In his study of religious change in
Nicaragua during the 1980s, anthropologist Henri Gooren noted that “the conflict was essentially a
political power struggle over the control of the Roman Catholic believers,” with the official church
hierarchy retaining strong support from “rural and urban elites” while alienating the poorer sectors of
Nicaraguan society, which tended to support the Sandinistas and the popular church ([19], p. 344).4
Similar divisions wracked the evangelical Protestant churches. Most evangelical denominations
belonged to the Evangelical Committee for Aid Development (CEPAD), an organization that Gustavo
Parajon, a Baptist medical doctor, founded in 1972 to assist in relief efforts after a devastating
earthquake struck the country ([32], frame 295). In addition to spreading the Gospel, CEPAD
promoted progressive causes and development projects, and received funding from the National
Council of Churches and the World Council of Churches [33]. As investigative groups from the
United States reported, CEPAD had a friendly though not totally uncritical relationship with the
Sandinista government. According to one account, “about three months after the fall of Somoza,
500 evangelical pastors connected with CEPAD endorsed a document thanking God for the fall of the
Somoza dictatorship and affirming the goals of the revolution,” though they maintained the primacy
of their commitment to Jesus Christ and the Gospel ([32], frame 295). A number of anti-Sandinista
groups in the United States, including the Institute on Religion and Democracy, criticized Parajon and
the members of CEPAD for their willingness to work with the Sandinista government, which they
alleged suggested Parajon was “a loyal Sandinista” and a promoter of Liberation Theology [34].
Yet the CEPAD pastors noted that the evangelical community as a whole held mixed views.
According to them, even though most evangelical denominations belonged to CEPAD, a slight majority
4 Gooren also notes that this disillusionment with the Catholic church led some of the laity to convert to Protestantism
(typically Pentecostalism); the Catholic church lost considerable market share to the Protestant churches during the
1980s ([19], p. 340).
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of Nicaraguan evangelicals were actually “conservative, fearful of Communism and involved only
with spiritual matters” ([32], frame 295). In 1980, a small group of conservative pastors who opposed
the FSLN and its political aims joined together to form the National Council of Evangelical Pastors
of Nicaragua (CNPEN) [35]. This organization developed close ties with political conservatives and
evangelical groups in the United States, such as the National Association of Evangelicals and the World
Evangelical Fellowship ([36], p. 2). Still, as the CEPAD pastors told the interviewers, a significant
number of evangelicals, including the majority of young evangelicals, were “progressive moderates”
who supported the Sandinistas with some reservations ([32], frame 295; [37]). Additionally, these
pastors reported that a small number of evangelicals identified themselves as “radical revolutionaries
strongly influenced by liberation theology” ([32], frame 295). Age played an important role in these
ideological divisions within the evangelical churches. A group of Baptist seminary students related
numerous examples of young Baptists, Pentecostals, and non-denominational evangelicals who
worked actively for the revolution. They contrasted the beliefs these young evangelicals held with the
views of older pastors and church members, who tended to embrace the same conservative ideological
perspectives of their co-religionists in the United States and thus rejected revolutionary activity ([38],
frames 245–48).
Meanwhile, those evangelicals and Catholics who had participated actively in the revolution
shared a sense that the goals of the FSLN aligned with their Christian beliefs and the social teachings of
the Bible. John Stam, a U.S. evangelical missionary based in Costa Rica who aided Sandinistas
and refugees fleeing from Somoza’s forces in 1978 and 1979, shared numerous accounts about
revolutionaries at the Sandinista safe house he served who blended their faith with their fight for the
FSLN ([39], p. 201). He reported to evangelicals in the United States that Christian themes infused the
most popular revolutionary songs and that the Sandinista fighters he met and prayed with yearned
to promote social justice and “full and responsible Christian participation in the birth of a really new
Nicaragua” ([40], pp. 2–3). After Somoza’s ouster, many of these Christian Sandinistas worked in the
FSLN government or worked on its behalf through organizations they founded, such as the Protestant
Commission for the Promotion of Social Responsibility (CEPRES) and the Centro Ecumenico Antonio
Valdiviso (CAV) [41,42]. In one pastoral letter, CAV explained that it operated with the express aim of
“proclaiming the Good News of the Kingdom” while “denouncing those . . . that oppose the building
of a New Society,” much as the revolutionary Christians that Stam had encountered in his ministry
hoped to do ([43], frames 75–76).
The FSLN leadership seized on these links that the Sandinista fighters drew between the revolution
and their religious beliefs in their attempts to build broader support for their movement among
Catholics and Protestants. To this end, in October 1980, the FSLN National Directorate released an
official statement that praised the role Christians had played in the revolution and pledged that the
new Sandinista government would protect the religious freedom of all Nicaraguans ([44], pp. 2, 20–31).
The statement celebrated revolutionary priests—such as Gaspar García Laviana, who attributed his
willingness to die for “the liberation of the people” to his belief that God desired freedom for all—for
blending their “Christian vocation and the revolutionary conscience” ([44], p. 11). It also played
up the relationship between the FSLN’s political goals and the foundations of the Christian faith,
incorporating Biblical verses about renewal and the command to care for all people as evidence that
Christianity, the revolution, and Sandinista-style socialism went hand in hand ([44], pp. 4, 9; [45]).
Yet these efforts to gain Catholic and Protestant support by relating the aims of the revolution to the
Christian faith ultimately exacerbated the intra-denominational ideological divides discussed earlier.
Indeed, despite the promises the National Directorate made in its statement on religion, many
conservative Catholics and evangelicals in Nicaragua and the United States doubted the sincerity of
the FSLN’s commitment to religious liberty. These doubts, coupled with their skeptical reading of the
religious rhetoric the FSLN had attempted to adopt, sowed the seeds for Christian nationalist conflict
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as U.S.-backed anti-Sandinista forces began to coalesce in 1981 to 1982 and mount increasingly serious
challenges to the Sandinistas’ hold on power.5
Humberto Belli, a former Marxist and editor of the Nicaraguan newspaper La Prensa, became a
particularly influential critic of the FSLN’s religious policies. After the Sandinistas shuttered La Prensa,
Belli moved to the United States and began publishing damning screeds against the Sandinistas,
focusing in particular on their attempts to politicize Christianity. In several pieces, he recounted how
he and his fellow La Prensa editors unearthed a secret FSLN memo that instructed all regional leaders to
transform Christmas from a religious celebration to “a special day for the children, one ‘with a different
content, fundamentally political,’” to ensure that everything—including the Christian faith—remained
“inside the revolution” [46]. Likewise, he argued that the Sandinista government’s 1981 New Year’s
address, which “proclaimed that ‘the true Christians, the sincere Christians, embrace the option of the
Sandinista revolution, which in Nicaragua today is the road toward the option for the poor,’” made
manifest the FSLN’s intention to cast opponents of the revolution as opponents of Christianity ([47],
p. 45). Belli opposed this form of Christian nationalism, stating that the FSLN’s demands that
“Christians give unconditional support to the revolution, not to the Church” and efforts to merge
Christian beliefs with Marxist-Leninist principles perverted Christianity ([47], p. 46). He noted that
these imperatives also opened those Christians who did not pledge their fealty to the state to reprisals.
Along with the Institute on Religion and Democracy (IRD) and other anti-Sandinista activists
in the United States, Belli reported that such reprisals began in mid-1981 when the Sandinistas
started harassing and marginalizing religious groups that did not lend their full support to the FSLN
government. He argued that “the Sandinistas have achieved this partly by giving the revolutionary
Christians exclusive access to the virtual state monopoly of the mass media,” while preventing
conservative Catholics and evangelicals from communicating with their followers through newspapers,
radio, or television ([47], p. 47). In a booklet entitled “Nicaragua: A Revolution Against the Church?”
the IRD stated that in July 1981, the Sandinistas barred the Catholic Archbishop of Managua from
making his customary television broadcast of Sunday Mass because they wanted only “pro-Sandinista
priests” on the air ([48], pp. 13–14). According to the IRD and Humberto Belli, this media blackout
and new laws that forbade Nicaraguans from making negative statements about the regime to people
abroad made it nearly impossible for these conservative Christians to share their plight with the
rest of the world ([47], p. 48). Similarly, when the Sandinistas arrested and killed a number of
Miskito Indians for engaging in guerilla warfare against the FSLN, and then forcibly relocated around
10,000 predominately Moravian Christian Miskitos to resettlement camps to contain them, Belli decried
Sandinista efforts to isolate them and silence their protests ([32], frames 287–88; [47], p. 49).
According to U.S. evangelical observers, this pattern of harassment escalated further in 1982 when
Sandinista organizations vandalized and seized a number of churches. These incidences occurred
within the context of mounting counterrevolutionary pressures, which led the Sandinistas to impose
a State of Emergency on the country in March 1982, restricting a number of civil liberties including
freedom of speech and of the press. With this in mind, sympathetic observers described the attacks
on the evangelical churches as a simple government misunderstanding, noting that after CEPAD
complained, FSLN leader Daniel Ortega returned the church buildings, “apologized for the mistake and
repeated the government’s clear commitment to religious liberty” ([32], frame 290). Yet FSLN distrust
of the conservative evangelical groups persisted, particularly as U.S.-based counterrevolutionary
forces—which had ties to some of these Nicaraguan church groups—intensified their media and
international public opinion campaign against the Sandinistas.
5 As historian Greg Grandin recounts, in these years the C.I.A. and some members of Reagan’s National Security Council
began providing covert aid to former members of Somoza’s National Guardsmen, as well as to the anti-FSLN Nicaraguan
Democratic Union, to help them form a counterrevolutionary movement that would oppose and seek to overthrow the
Sandinista government ([17], pp. 113–14).
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U.S. interventions aimed at undermining the Sandinista government raised the stakes considerably.
In 1981, members of the State Department and Reagan’s national security advisors were divided over
how to best respond to the revolution in Nicaragua as well as to the civil war unfolding in El Salvador,
which they viewed as connected developments and as evidence of Soviet and Cuban efforts to seize
control of Central America ([18], pp. 75, 77). During a meeting of National Security Council (NSC) on
16 November 1981, the Reagan administration worked to come to an agreement on an appropriate
policy response. Through these discussions, the president and the NSC developed National Security
Decision Directive 17 (NSDD 17), which Reagan signed on 4 January 1982. NSDD 17 affirmed U.S.
“support for those nations which embrace the principles of democracy and freedom for their people,”
and as such declared that the Reagan administration would “support democratic forces in Nicaragua”
as well as lend assistance to anti-insurgency groups throughout Central America [49]. To this end,
in April 1981, the Reagan administration suspended U.S. economic assistance to Nicaragua and,
later that year, authorized the CIA to train and arm the Contras, a group of counterrevolutionaries
which included former members of Somoza’s National Guard. As historian David Painter notes,
although Reagan claimed that the goal of these polices was to halt Sandinista aid to the growing
insurgency in El Salvador, “[their] main objective quickly became the overthrow of the Nicaraguan
government” ([50], p. 99). By 1982, Contra forces had begun to launch attacks in Nicaragua, leading
the FSLN to seek support from the Soviet Union and Cuba to shore up its defenses and to declare an
official State of Emergency.
In addition to laying the groundwork for the covert counterinsurgency war against the Sandinistas,
NSDD 17 also set the stage for a pro-Contra public relations campaign in the United States, a campaign
that would ultimately draw heavily on Christian nationalist themes. Reflecting Reagan administration
concern about congressional and public opinion against lending support to counterrevolutionary
groups, NSDD 17 placed the NSC’s plan to “create a public information task force to inform the
public and Congress of the critical situation in the area” first in its enumerated list of decisions [49].
The passage of the first Boland Amendment in December 1982, which prohibited the use of
congressionally-appropriated funds to “furnish military equipment, military training or advice,
or other support for military activities . . . for the purpose of overthrowing the government of
Nicaragua,” bore out the Reagan administration’s concerns about congressional resistance to its policy
agenda [51]. When Congress passed a second Boland Amendment in late 1983 prohibiting “covert
assistance for military operations in Nicaragua,” and then banned aid for military and paramilitary
operations in Nicaragua entirely in 1984, the administration launched a concerted effort to bring
congressional and public opinion around to supporting to the Contras [52,53].
Allegations that the Sandinistas violated the human rights of their political opponents and
persecuted non-revolutionary Christians formed the centerpiece of White House outreach on behalf of
the Contras. Faith Ryan Whittlesey, the director of the Office of Public Liaison, discussed this strategy
to mobilize public opinion explicitly as she and her staff considered how to best communicate the
president’s aims in Central America. Department memoranda called for a strategy that would “trigger
humanitarian emotions,” by sharing the details of “the utter inhumanity and unspeakable cruelties
of Marxist guerillas in Central America” through “case studies, documentation,” and the like [54].
They also proposed religious theme lines, such as emphasizing the incompatibility of revolutionary
activities and Christianity ([54], p. 5). The Office of Public Liaison noted that “nongovernment support
must be recruited and prepositioned for activation,” by inviting key groups to the White House for
foreign policy seminars and following up with regular policy updates, which would provide them
with information to incorporate into letter writing and lobbying campaigns ([54], pp. 12, 15, 18).
The memo recommended that the White House look to conservative Protestant and Catholic religious
organizations in the United States in particular to participate in these activities.
In May 1983, the Office of Public Liaison began holding weekly briefings on U.S.–Central
American relations for political, business, and religious leaders from all denominations and political
perspectives [55]. For a seminar on religious persecution in Nicaragua, Whittlesey invited a number of
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“eyewitnesses” to share their experiences, including the former La Prensa editor Humberto Belli,
a self-described Pentecostal preacher and Sandinista torture victim named Prudencio de Jesus
Baltodano, and Geraldine O’Leary Macías, a former Maryknoll nun. When introducing the speakers,
Whittlesey addressed the ideological divisions within the Nicaraguan churches and argued that
“the Sandinista leadership is following a two-track policy of persecution and subversion” designed
to weaken conservative Christian churches, especially Protestant denominations, while cultivating
ties with more sympathetic churches ([56], p. 2). She also stated that “believers have been harassed,
arrested, and even tortured,” by the Sandinistas, allegations that her guest speakers elaborated on
in detail ([56], p. 2). Baltodano, for example, described Sandinistas tying him to a tree, torturing
him, cutting his ears off, and leaving him for dead because they suspected him of supporting the
Contras ([56], p. 7; [57]). Whittlesey invited Baltodano to speak at the briefings often because, as she
wrote to U.S. Ambassador Terence A. Todman, his testimony about this experience “unfailingly effects
a dramatic change in the attitude in the audience” [58].
To expand the reach of their messaging beyond the weekly briefings, the Office of Public Liaison
sent speakers out to events across the country, began publishing and distributing a special series of
White House Digests on the situation in Central America, and sent out targeted mailings to religious
groups ([55], pp. 1, 3). Some of the speakers, including Geraldine O’Leary Macías, also traveled abroad
under the auspices of the U.S. Information Agency to share their testimony with foreign political
leaders, religious organizations, and journalists in an effort to sway international public opinion [59].
The mailings and White House Digests suggested that the Sandinistas persecuted both Catholics and
Protestants, prevented Christians from evangelizing “within Sandinista organizations,” and only
allowed revolutionary Christians to participate in civic life [60]. They also included statements from
Belli, Baltodano, and other Nicaraguan evangelicals.
Evangelical organizations in the United States, already publishing actively about religious
persecution throughout the world and in Central America, amplified these messages from the Reagan
White House. Christian news services that focused on religious freedom, such as Jesus to the Communist
World and the Open Doors News Service, shared regular updates with their readers about evangelicals
who faced arrest and torture at the hands of the Sandinistas [61–63]. The Institute on Religion
and Democracy and other Christian organizations incorporated reports about Sandinista attacks
on religious liberty into their fundraising campaigns [64]. In all cases, these groups conveyed the
impression that the Sandinistas engaged in widespread yet selective religious repression, targeting only
those “true” Christians who rejected Marxism and the FSLN. In this way, they attacked the Sandinista
nationalism of revolutionary Christians in Nicaragua, while promoting their own version of Christian
nationalism—an American Christian nationalism rooted in democratic and liberal capitalist principles.
Yet despite the allegations that the Reagan administration and its religious surrogates made about
Sandinista religious persecution, U.S.-backed Contra forces committed extensive and appalling human
rights abuses, which opponents of Reagan’s policies publicized extensively.6 Politically progressive and
moderate Catholics, Mainline Protestants, and evangelicals spoke out against the war in Nicaragua
through pamphlets, newspaper editorials, letter writing campaigns to their representatives, and
testimony before Congress. These religious leaders focused on the Contras’ poor human rights record
and questioned the Reagan administration’s foreign policy objectives in Central America. One brochure
from the Inter-Religious Task Force, an interdenominational activist organization, compiled statements
from a wide range of religious leaders who argued that the firsthand experiences of their missionaries
and sister churches in Nicaragua made clear “that poverty, oppression and injustice are the primary
causes of unrest in the region,” not “Soviet and Cuban-directed agitation and aggression,” as the
Reagan administration claimed [65]. The prominent evangelical social justice activist Jim Wallis also
6 As Greg Grandin recounts, the Contras killed, kidnapped, and tortured thousands of civilians. He quotes one advisor to
the Joint Chiefs of Staff describing them as “just a bunch of killers,” and notes the Contras themselves admitted to vast
atrocities ([17], p. 115).
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drew on firsthand experience in a searing piece in Sojourners about his trip to Nicaragua with the
anti-Contra organization Witness for Peace, in which he recounted:
I will not easily forget another mother who tearfully told us how her 13-year-old daughter
was decapitated by a contra mortar, or the Baptist pastor who could not understand the
brutality of the contras who hacked to death with machetes a whole group of evangelical
teenagers who were simply teaching campesinos how to read . . . Every Witness for Peace
volunteer can tell stories of terror, torture, rape, pillage, and murder carried out by the
contras ([66], p. 4).
Such essays aimed to counter the narratives of Sandinista brutality against Christians that
conservative organizations shared, seeking to undermine their portrayal of the contras as defenders of
religious liberty and American political values.
The fierce disagreements among and within Christian denominations over U.S. policy in
Nicaragua greatly intensified the debates in Congress over Reagan administration requests for contra
funding in 1985 and 1986. As historian Theresa Keeley has shown, the testimony of Catholic anti-contra
activists, including Maryknoll nuns and Jesuit priests, played a significant role in shaping congressional
attitudes against contra funding, yet also pushed the Reagan administration to recruit conservative
Catholic allies to lend moral support to his cause ([25], pp. 548, 554). These allies, along with
conservative Protestant and evangelical activists, proved effective at softening congressional resistance,
particularly after FSLN leader Daniel Ortega sought direct aid from the Soviet Union and extended
the State of Emergency, further restricting civil liberties, which bolstered contra supporters’ negative
claims about the Sandinistas ([25], p. 548; [67], p. 226; [68]). Evangelical and Christian fundamentalist
media personalities such as Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson, whom the White House invited to receive
special briefings from Oliver North on U.S.–Nicaraguan relations, urged their followers to contact
Congress in advance of pending votes on contra funding [69]. The Reagan administration’s public
relations efforts to undermine its liberal adversaries bore fruit in June 1985, when Congress passed a
measure to extend humanitarian aid to the Contras. This aid did not include any funds for military
purposes, however, so the White House shifted its religious outreach and lobbying efforts into high
gear in advance of a March 1986 congressional vote over military funding.
Christian nationalist rhetoric took center stage in this campaign as Reagan pressured Congress
to extend an additional $100 million in aid to contra forces, most of it expressly intended for military
purposes. In early 1986, the White House made a five-minute long videotape of President Reagan
discussing the conflict in Nicaragua for the Christian media to air on its networks. In the tape, Reagan
implored American Christians to contact their congressmen and tell them to support the contra
“Freedom Fighters” in the vote on military aid [70]. He blended national and religious ideals as he
castigated Sandinista restrictions on civil liberties, particularly religious freedom, and connected the
Christian faith with American democracy and anti-communism explicitly in his closing words when
he intoned:
In this time when freedom has flashed out like a great astonishing light in the most
surprising places;—in this time when democracy is new again, and communism is more
and more revealed as an old idea that’s as tired as tyranny;—in this time it is nothing less
than a sin to see Central America fall to darkness. Let’s not let it happen. It won’t if we work
together. We can save Central America, with the help of your senators and representatives.
Please let them know how you feel. Thank you . . . and God bless you all [71].
These media pieces mobilized evangelical Christians, many of whom had already donated money
directly to the contras through fundraising campaigns that Pat Robertson coordinated through his
aid organization Operation Blessing, and advertised on his television show The 700 Club [72–75].
In addition to the videotape, which the White House sent to Jerry Falwell, Pat Robertson and
the Christian Broadcasting Network, the Trinity Broadcasting Network, and other major Christian
Religions 2016, 7, 151 10 of 16
television outlets, Reagan also recorded a 60-second long audio message that went out to over
1500 Christian radio stations across the country [76,77]. These messages included instructions for
listeners to call a 1–800 number, which would connect them with the contact information for their
congressional representatives so that viewers and listeners could call or write letters urging them
to support the president’s policies [76,77]. These constituent letters and phone calls poured in to
congress, providing additional moral backing to legislators who supported White House policy on
Central America.
Reagan’s approach of conflating Sandinista victory with “sin” and “darkness” in contrast to
American democracy and freedom also proved effective in the congressional debate that followed.
Senators and representatives who supported the president’s foreign policy agenda in Nicaragua
reiterated these points, sharing details on Sandinista persecution of Catholics and Protestants; some
even participated in hearings on the threats that communism and Liberation Theology posed to the
survival of the Church in Central America [78]. Opponents of the military aid measure also appealed
to religious themes, marshaling evidence of contra human rights violations and religious persecution,
and incorporating statements and testimony from anti-contra Catholic and Protestant leaders into the
proceedings [79,80]. In the end though, the contra supporters edged out their opponents. Congress
approved the $100 million spending measure.
This military support for the contras did not end the religious controversy over the conflict in
Nicaragua, of course, which continued throughout the rest of the contra war and only intensified
as the details of the Iran-Contra scandal emerged. Still, in 1987, evangelical news sources reported
that “the Sandinista government has recently adopted a more relaxed approach toward the Church
and that evangelistic activities within the country are at an all-time high” ([81], p. 9). Yet they also
noted that the National Association of Evangelicals had announced its intention to participate in
a worldwide prayer campaign to protest Sandinista religious repression, including the closure of
religious radio stations and limitations on church publications, which they argued made evangelism
“extremely difficult” ([81], p. 10). Conflicting reports about the extent of ongoing Sandinista persecution
abounded. After the Sandinistas signed the Esquipulas Peace Agreement in 1987, in which they and
the other Central American leaders committed to pursue economic cooperation, democratic reforms,
and conflict resolution, they loosened some restrictions on internal opposition groups. By January
1988, the FSLN had ended the six-year long state of emergency, a move that conservative Christians
in the United States and Nicaragua welcomed, though with some skepticism [82]. The democratic
elections that followed in 1990 ousted the Sandinistas from power.
The ideological divisions that emerged during the revolution and the contra war continued to
rive Nicaraguan Christian groups after the election and well into the 1990s. As Henri Gooren notes in
his anthropological study of the post-Sandinista religious marketplace in Nicaragua, in the early 1990s
“the Roman Catholic Church remain[ed] divided between a conservative hierarchy and a sizeable
minority, made up of the so-called ‘popular church’” ([19], p. 354). Evangelical church members also
seemed to vary in their political views; many worshippers who belonged to indigenous churches
(a significant proportion of the evangelical population) continued to support the FSLN, while those
belonging to churches with stronger ties to U.S. denominations tended to have more negative views
of the Sandinistas ([19], p. 353). That said, some revolutionary evangelical organizations, such as the
Comisión Evangélica de Promoción de La Responsabilidad Social, worked to strengthen their relations with
liberal Protestant churches in the United States in the late 1980s and early 1990s [83].
Thus although to some extent the contra war compromised evangelistic efforts by U.S. churches
due to the associations that Nicaraguans drew between them, the United States, and the contras—just
as Billy Graham and C. René Padilla had warned decade earlier at the Congress on World
Evangelization—the evangelical churches and organizations that cooperated with the Sandinistas
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experienced tremendous growth during the 1980s.7 The Sandinistas had tended to brand their
more conservative brethren, those with ties to U.S. churches and evangelists such as Pat Robertson,
as imperialists, which somewhat dampened their appeal. In some ways, the evangelical experience in
Nicaragua bore out C. René Padilla’s vision: rejecting “American culture Christianity” and moving
toward indigenous evangelism models enabled them to flourish. Their growth put the Roman Catholic
Church in Nicaragua on the defensive, contributing to ongoing interdenominational conflict in addition
to the intra-denominational ideological conflicts that affected both Protestants and Catholics.
Christian nationalism did not cause the contra war, obviously, but the rhetoric of Christian
nationalism raised the stakes for all concerned. Religious beliefs, commingled with ideas about
freedom and democracy, formed part of the ideological prism through which Reagan viewed U.S.
interests in Central America. Operationalized Christian nationalism encouraged U.S. conservative
Christians to rally around the president and promote his policy agenda. It also led revolutionary
Christians in Nicaragua to lend their support to the Sandinistas, with some even opting to serve in
the FSLN government. Nicaraguan Christians, emboldened by the Sandinista vision for a new nation
which seemed to embrace their religious commitments to social justice, went to war to fight for the
FSLN. Likewise, the contras and their U.S. supporters fought (or funded the effort) to “save” Nicaragua
from the “sin” of communism, with its attendant state-sanctioned atheism and religious persecution.
That both combatants adopted the mantle of Christian nationalism, and operationalized the concept,
demonstrates just how malleable the concept was—but also how powerful. The tactic of conflating
faith and nation, or national political principles, proved exceedingly effective in mobilizing people to
take political and military action.
For this reason, using the lens of Christian nationalism to examine a conflict between two deeply
Christian nations illuminates how ideology, core national values, and religious beliefs shape foreign
policy. The belief that there was an enduring relationship between Christianity and American principles
influenced how U.S. evangelicals defined their foreign policy objectives and shaped their success
in projecting them abroad. When U.S. evangelicals lobbied their congressional representatives to
fund the contras in order to protect religious liberty and prevent anti-religious totalitarian forces
from gaining a foothold in Nicaragua, they brought American Christian nationalism to the global
arena. From their perspective, threats to religious liberty posed a grave threat to their ability to spread
the Gospel throughout the entire world and “make disciples of all nations” [84,85]. Regimes that
repressed Christians also imperiled the advance of democracy throughout the world. Evangelicals
viewed religious liberty as the foundation of human rights—and of democracy. Accordingly, states that
denied religious liberty were undemocratic—and, in the context of the Cold War, a danger to American
national interests as well as evangelical objectives. The United States, as a bastion of religious freedom
and democracy, stood in stark contrast to such regimes [86].
Using Christian nationalism as an analytic concept thus allows us to sharpen our understanding
of the essential ideas that motivated U.S. evangelical policy opinion and activism in the late twentieth
century. It also allows us to better appreciate how Christians and non-Christians in other countries
contested, rejected, and adapted this concept to suit their local contexts. The language that Reagan,
evangelical leaders, and allies in Congress used to discuss the contra war reflected the intertwinement
of spiritual beliefs with American values and democratic principles that constitute American Christian
nationalism. Christian nationalism (and internationalism) ultimately complemented the ideology
and foreign policy objectives of the Ronald Reagan administration in Central America. Yet the deep
divisions that Christian nationalist rhetoric drove into religious life in Nicaragua highlights why
Graham and Padilla spoke about this concept with such anxiety and existential foreboding at the
Congress on World Evangelism in 1974.
7 Gooren notes that the evangelical churches gained considerable market share between 1980 and 1989, with the evangelical
population nearly doubling (from about 8% of the population to roughly 15% and continuing to grow) ([19], p 348).
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